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[795] 
Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie 
Adam N. Steinman* 
The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Atlantic Marine clarified several things 
about the enforcement of forum-selection clauses in federal court. But something 
important was missing from Justice Alito’s opinion—the Erie doctrine. Erie, of course, 
helps to determine the applicability of state law in federal court, and state law 
potentially has a lot to say about contractual forum-selection clauses. Indeed, Erie was 
front and center the last time the Court confronted the enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses in federal court, when it decided Stewart Organization v. Ricoh a quarter 
century ago.  
 
This article examines the Atlantic Marine decision through the lens of Erie, and 
explores the role that Erie and state law should play in the Atlantic Marine framework. 
Atlantic Marine may appear at first glance to mandate virtually unflinching 
enforcement of forum-selection clauses. But Justice Alito’s approach in Atlantic 
Marine applies only when the forum-selection clause is “contractually valid.” Properly 
understood, Erie requires federal courts to look to state law to decide this question—at 
least in diversity cases. To allow federal courts to disregard state law in applying 
Atlantic Marine would raise several troubling Erie concerns: geographic relocation 
contrary to what would occur in state court; changing the substantive law that would 
govern the ultimate merits of the litigation in state court; and overriding state contract 
law and contractual remedies via the sort of federal common law that Erie forbids.  
 
 * Frank M. Johnson Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of 
Law. This Article benefitted greatly from discussions with the other participants at this symposium—
Andrew Bradt, Kevin Clermont, Scott Dodson, Robin Effron, Mary Kay Kane, Rick Marcus, Linda 
Mullenix, Steve Sachs, Brad Shannon, and Jim Wagstaffe. I am also grateful to Jenny Carroll and 
Heather Elliott for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to the editors of the 
Hastings Law Journal, both for organizing a fantastic symposium and for their excellent editorial work 
on this Article. 
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Introduction 
In his opinion for the Court in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. 
U.S. District Court,1 Justice Alito neither cited nor discussed Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2 Yet forum-selection clauses implicate 
precisely the sort of vertical choice-of-law issues that are at the heart of 
the Erie doctrine. Indeed, the choice between state law and federal law 
was front-and-center the last time the Supreme Court addressed the 
relationship between forum-selection clauses and the federal venue-
transfer statutes. In its 1988 decision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh 
Corp.,3 the Court seemed to declare that state law regarding such clauses 
plays no role in deciding whether a transfer of venue is justified under 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a).4 
Given Atlantic Marine’s silence on the potential role of state law 
with respect to forum-selection clauses, it is worth examining that 
decision’s framework through the lens of Erie. Properly understood, 
Atlantic Marine opens the door for state law to play a more significant 
role than many anticipated in the wake of Stewart. Most significantly, 
Justice Alito recognized that the enforcement of a forum-selection clause 
via a § 1404(a) venue-transfer motion (or a forum non conveniens 
motion, for that matter) hinges on a determination that the forum-
selection clause is “contractually valid.”5 
There are strong arguments that state law should govern the 
question of whether a forum-selection clause is contractually valid, and 
that a federal court should not have freestanding authority to displace 
state law on contractual validity with its own preferred approach. This 
 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013). 
 2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 4. See id. at 27, 30 n.9 (“[A] district court sitting in diversity must apply a federal statute that 
controls the issue before the court and that represents a valid exercise of Congress’ constitutional 
powers. . . . Our determination that § 1404(a) governs the parties’ dispute notwithstanding any contrary 
Alabama policy makes it unnecessary to address the contours of state law.”). 
 5. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.5. 
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would be in some tension with Stewart, admittedly. But intervening 
developments in the Supreme Court’s approach to the Erie doctrine—in 
addition to lines of argument that the Stewart majority did not address—
bolster the case that state law, not federal law, should govern whether a 
forum-selection clause is contractually valid. Accordingly, Atlantic Marine 
does not mandate unflinching enforcement of forum-selection clauses 
without any mechanism for parties to raise legitimate concerns about the 
use and operation of such clauses in certain contexts. Rather, Atlantic 
Marine should be read to defer to state law on such matters.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the Atlantic 
Marine decision. Part II briefly describes Erie and the vertical choice-of-
law frameworks that have sprung up around that venerable, perhaps 
mythical,6 decision. Part III assesses whether Erie demands the application 
of state contract law in determining the contractual validity of a forum-
selection clause, while Part IV addresses whether the general authority 
to transfer venue provided by § 1404(a) justifies federalizing the issue of 
contract validity. Part V considers Justice Alito’s recognition that 
“extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the 
parties”7 may permit a federal court to deny a § 1404(a) motion despite a 
contractually valid forum-selection clause, and explores how such an 
inquiry would fit within the Erie framework. Part VI concludes by 
synthesizing these arguments to explain how federal courts should 
approach forum-selection clauses in light of Erie and Atlantic Marine. 
I.  The ATLANTIC MARINE Decision 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Marine, written by Justice 
Alito for a unanimous Court, addressed a number of issues relating to 
the enforcement of forum-selection clauses. The case began in a Texas 
federal district court, where J-Crew Management, Inc. (a Texas 
corporation) sued Atlantic Marine Construction Co. (a Virginia 
corporation).8 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).9 Atlantic Marine had contracted with the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to build a child development center at Fort 
Hood in Texas, and Atlantic Marine had entered into a subcontract with 
J-Crew.10 J-Crew’s lawsuit sought nearly $160,000 for Atlantic Marine’s 
 
 6. See generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974) 
(arguing against the “myth” that Erie “carried some special constitutional magic”). 
 7. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575, 581. 
 8. Id. at 575. 
 9. Id. at 576. 
 10. Id. at 575. 
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failure to pay under the subcontract.11 That subcontract contained the 
following forum-selection clause:  
[J-Crew] agrees that all . . . disputes . . . shall be litigated in the Circuit 
Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. The 
Parties hereto expressly consent to the jurisdiction and venue of said 
courts.12  
 Atlantic Marine sought to enforce the forum-selection clause via a 
number of alternative means. First, it asked that the case be dismissed 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3),13 which authorizes 
dismissal for “improper venue.”14 Second, Atlantic Marine sought 
transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406,15 
which authorizes transfer from a venue that is “wrong” to a venue where 
the case “could have been brought.”16 Third, Atlantic Marine sought 
transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),17 
which provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any 
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any 
district or division to which all parties have consented.”18 
The federal district court in Texas denied all these requests, and 
Atlantic Marine petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss or 
transfer the case. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, noting that 
Atlantic Marine was required to show a “clear and indisputable” right to 
the issuance of the writ.19 According to the Fifth Circuit, Atlantic Marine 
failed to satisfy this standard because the district court “did not clearly 
abuse its discretion” either in considering the forum-selection clause 
 
 11. Joint Appendix at 9, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (alleging an unpaid balance of 
$159,675.87). 
 12. United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 2012 WL 8499879, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 13. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576. 
 14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (authorizing a motion to dismiss for “improper venue”). 
 15. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576. 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue 
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to 
any district or division in which it could have been brought.”). 
 17. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576. 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 19. In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 2012) (“With respect to the second 
requirement—that the petitioner’s right to issuance of the writ must be ‘clear and indisputable’—this Court 
has made clear that ‘we are not to issue a writ to correct a mere abuse of discretion, even though such might 
be reversible on a normal appeal.’ Instead, we will only grant mandamus relief when errors ‘produce a 
patently erroneous result’ and ‘clearly exceed[] the bounds of judicial discretion.’” (quoting In re Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc., 545 F. 3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
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under § 1404(a) or in conducting its § 1404(a) analysis.20 Atlantic Marine 
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the 
Court granted.21 
The Supreme Court first addressed the proper procedural vehicles 
for enforcing a forum-selection clause. Justice Alito’s opinion held that 
such a clause cannot be enforced by either a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to 
dismiss or a 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) motion to transfer. He explained: “Section 
1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) allow dismissal only when venue is ‘wrong’ or 
‘improper.’ Whether venue is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends exclusively 
on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies the 
requirements of federal venue laws, and those provisions say nothing 
about a forum-selection clause.”22 In Atlantic Marine, of course, the 
Western District of Texas was a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(b)(2) because the parties entered into the contract in that district 
and it was to be performed there (where Fort Hood was located).23 
So what motion should a party seeking to enforce a forum-selection 
clause file? If the forum-selection clause points to another federal district, 
a party may file a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).24 Section 
1404(a), Justice Alito explained, “permits transfer to any district where 
venue is also proper (i.e., ‘where [the case] might have been brought’) or 
to any other district to which the parties have agreed by contract or 
stipulation.”25 If the forum-selection clause points to a state court or a 
foreign forum, a party may file a motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens.26 Prompted by an amicus brief filed by fellow symposium 
contributor Stephen Sachs, the Court also acknowledged the view that a 
party may enforce a forum-selection clause by filing a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6); but the Court declined to resolve this question 
 
 20. Id. (“Atlantic urges that the district court clearly abused its discretion (1) by considering 
enforcement of the forum-selection clause under § 1404(a), instead of under Rule 12(b)(3) and § 1406, 
and (2) by committing errors when conducting its analysis under § 1404(a). Because we find the 
district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in either respect, we deny Atlantic’s petition.”). 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Atlantic Marine did not address whether the 
prerequisites for the “extraordinary” writ of mandamus were present. Cf. Cheney v. United States 
District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (“This is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for 
really extraordinary causes.’” (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947))). 
 21. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576; see also Atl. Marine, 133 S. Ct. 1748, 1748 (2013) (granting writ 
of certiorari). 
 22. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577. 
 23. Id. at 576 n.1. 
 24. Id. at 579 (“Section 1404(a) . . . provides a mechanism for enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses that point to a particular federal district.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 580 (“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or 
foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”); see also id. at 583 n.8 (noting that the 
approach to § 1404(a) forum-selection-clause transfers should also “apply to motions to dismiss for forum 
non conveniens in cases involving valid forum-selection clauses pointing to state or foreign forums”). 
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because Atlantic Marine had never filed such a motion and neither party 
addressed in their briefing whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would have 
been proper.27 
Justice Alito’s opinion then turned to how a court should evaluate a 
§ 1404(a) motion that is “premised on a forum-selection clause.”28 The 
answer is that, “when the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection 
clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum 
specified in that clause. Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated 
to the convenience of the parties should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”29 I 
have placed emphasis on the word “valid” in the first sentence of this 
quotation, because Justice Alito emphasized it as well—not with italics 
but rather with footnote 5 of the opinion, which appears at the end of 
that sentence. Footnote 5 states: “Our analysis presupposes a contractually 
valid forum-selection clause.”30 
The opinion does not address how a court should decide whether a 
forum-selection clause is valid. I hope to provide some preliminary 
thoughts on that question in this Article. It is clear, however, that the 
Atlantic Marine opinion itself places no restrictions on a court’s 
assessment of contractual validity in the first instance. 
Assuming a contractually valid forum-selection clause exists, how 
should a federal court analyze a § 1404(a) motion or a forum non 
conveniens motion seeking to enforce that clause? Justice Alito began by 
acknowledging the factors that govern such motions as a general matter. 
One set of factors involve “the parties’ private interests,” which include: 
[R]elative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory 
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining 
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view 
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems 
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.31  
A court should also consider “[p]ublic-interest factors,” which include 
“the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the 
interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home 
with the law.”32 In addition, a court must “give some weight to the 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum.”33 
When such a motion is based on a valid forum-selection clause, 
however, a court must approach the motion differently. First, as Justice 
 
 27. Id. at 580 (“Petitioner, however, did not file a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), and the parties did not 
brief the Rule’s application to this case at any stage of this litigation. We therefore will not consider it.”). 
 28. Id. at 581. 
 29. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 30. Id. at 581 n.5. 
 31. Id. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)). 
 32. Id. (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6). 
 33. Id. (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6). 
Steinman-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:07 PM 
April 2015]           ATLANTIC MARINE THROUGH THE LENS OF ERIE 801 
Alito explained, “the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight.”34 
Because the plaintiff is “the party defying the forum-selection clause,” 
the plaintiff is the one that “bears the burden of establishing that transfer 
to the forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted.”35 
Second, the court must not refuse to enforce a valid forum-selection 
clause based on “arguments about the parties’ private interests.”36 
Parties to such a clause “waive the right to challenge the preselected 
forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their 
witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.”37 With such private 
interest factors off the table, “a district court may consider arguments 
about public-interest factors only.”38 This leaves any party resisting a 
valid forum-selection clause with a daunting challenge. Justice Alito 
wrote that public interest factors alone “will rarely defeat a transfer 
motion.”39 Accordingly, “forum-selection clauses should control except in 
unusual cases. Although it is conceivable in a particular case that the 
district court would refuse to transfer a case notwithstanding the 
counterweight of a forum-selection clause, such cases will not be 
common.”40 Later in the opinion, Justice Alito summed it up this way: 
“As the party acting in violation of the forum-selection clause, J-Crew 
must bear the burden of showing that public-interest factors 
overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.”41 
There is one final way that a § 1404(a) motion based on a forum-
selection clause differs from other § 1404(a) motions. When a § 1404(a) 
motion is granted based on a valid forum-selection clause, the “transfer 
of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”42 
Rather, the transferee court (the one designated in the forum-selection 
clause) will apply its own choice-of-law rules. Because of Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Manufacturing Co.,43 this means the transferee court will follow 
the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it is located.44 This deviates 
from the rule that has generally governed § 1404(a) motions for the last 
half-century. In Van Dusen v. Barrack,45 the Court held that when a case 
 
 34. Id. at 581. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 582. 
 37. Id.; see also id. at 584 (“[J-Crew] promised to resolve its disputes in Virginia, and the District 
Court should not have given any weight to J-Crew’s current claims of inconvenience.”). 
 38. Id. at 582. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Id. at 583. 
 42. Id. at 582. 
 43. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 44. Id. at 496 (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must 
conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.” (citation omitted)). 
 45. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
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is transferred under § 1404(a), “the transferee district court must be 
obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied if there 
had been no change of venue.”46 Justice Alito made clear in Atlantic 
Marine that the Van Dusen rule does not apply “to cases where a 
defendant’s motion is premised on enforcement of a valid forum-selection 
clause.”47 
With this summary of the Atlantic Marine decision in mind, let us 
turn to Erie. 
II.  Federal Courts, State Law: ERIE and Its Choices 
Few Supreme Court decisions are as iconic as Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins.48 The overarching question of whether a federal court is 
bound to follow state law, however, implicates a variety of distinct 
doctrines whose relationship to Erie—and to each other—is far from 
clear.49 The Erie decision itself purported to be based on a constitutional 
constraint on the power of the federal judiciary.50 Although Justice 
Brandeis’s opinion was opaque about the content and scope of this 
limitation, one way to understand Erie’s constitutional core is this: If the 
sole basis for federal judicial lawmaking is that federal courts may 
adjudicate a particular dispute, such lawmaking cannot dictate the 
substantive rights that are the basis for the adjudication.51 This explains 
the basic conclusion in Erie that the mere existence of diversity 
jurisdiction did not authorize a federal court to displace the duty of care 
imposed by state tort law.52 The same principle applies with respect to 
 
 46. Id. at 639; see also Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (citing Van Dusen as “requiring that the state 
law applicable in the original court also apply in the transferee court”). 
 47. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583. There was no need for Justice Alito to create a special exception 
from Van Dusen in cases where a forum-selection clause is enforced via a forum non conveniens 
motion, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, because Van Dusen does not apply in the context of 
forum non conveniens. See Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (“The reasoning employed in Van 
Dusen v. Barrack is simply inapplicable to dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens.”). 
 48. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 49. See Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245, 306 (2008) (“[P]rofound 
uncertainties still exist about Erie’s source, its scope, and its relationship to other important issues 
relating to federalism and judicial power.”); id. at 306–16 (describing “Erie’s problems”). 
 50. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a state . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the 
federal courts.”). For arguments that Erie should be understood as resting on statutory rather than 
constitutional grounds, see Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: 
An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 Va. L. Rev. 707, 713 (2006); Ely, supra 
note 6, at 718; Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 595, 596 (2008); Martin H. 
Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate 
Dilemma, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 357–60 (1977); Allan D. Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 
48 Iowa L. Rev. 248, 254 (1963). 
 51. Steinman, supra note 49, at 316. 
 52. Id. 
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federal procedural lawmaking: the mere authority to develop procedures 
for adjudicating disputes is not a sufficient basis for the federal judiciary 
to impose federal substantive law.53 
Operating in tandem with this constitutional core are two other 
frameworks for choosing between state and federal law. Even if federal 
judicial lawmaking would not displace truly substantive state law rights, a 
federal court might still be obligated to follow state law. This is reflected 
in the principle that federal courts should follow state law in order to 
vindicate Erie’s “twin aims” of discouraging forum shopping and 
inequitable administration of laws.54 This inquiry might be called a “sub-
Erie” choice, because (1) it is not constitutionally mandated (unlike Erie’s 
core principle), and (2) opting for a federal rule would not displace state 
substantive law.55 
There is also a choice-of-law framework that operates in cases 
where there is a sufficient federal interest to justify federal judicial 
lawmaking that displaces substantive state law. As the Supreme Court’s 
“classic” federal common law cases recognize, substantive judicial 
lawmaking by federal courts is not improper per se; it merely requires 
the presence of a “uniquely federal interest.”56 But the presence of such 
a federal interest alone does not eliminate the role of state law. The 
federal court would need to inquire whether state law should be 
incorporated into federal common law. On a number of occasions, the 
Supreme Court has concluded that, although federal common law 
governs a particular issue, state law would provide the “federally 
prescribed rule of decision.”57 Incorporation of state law into federal 
common law is appropriate unless a “significant conflict exists between 
 
 53. Id. at 316–17. 
 54. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 55. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 323–24. That Erie’s twin aims are not constitutionally 
mandated is confirmed by the fact that the existence of a governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or 
federal statute can permit a federal court to disregard state law regardless of the potential impact on 
forum shopping or the inequitable administration of laws. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 415–16 (2010) (noting that applying a federal rule that induces 
forum shopping “is unacceptable when it comes as the consequence of judge-made rules created to fill 
supposed ‘gaps’ in positive federal law” but that “a Federal Rule governing procedure [adopted 
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act] is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case in a way 
that induces forum shopping” (emphasis added)). 
 56. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 306–08, 317–19 (discussing, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 
487 U.S. 500 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)). 
 57. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (holding that 
“federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in 
diversity” but “adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by 
state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits”); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991) (holding that “federal courts should incorporate state law into 
federal common law” to fill “a gap in the federal securities laws”). 
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an identifiable federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state 
law,”58 or there is a “need for a nationally uniform body of law.”59 
III.  ERIE and Forum-Selection Clauses 
In analyzing the relationship between Erie and forum-selection 
clauses, the crucial question is whether a federal court should be 
permitted to reach a different conclusion about the enforcement of a 
forum-selection clause than a state court would. To allow such a disparity 
between federal and state courts would raise three distinct but partially 
overlapping concerns under Erie. The first is a relocation concern: if a 
state court decides the forum-selection clause issue, the case will be 
adjudicated in State A; but if a federal court decides the forum-selection 
clause issue, the case will be adjudicated in State B. The second is a 
horizontal choice-of-law concern: if a state court decides the forum-selection 
clause issue, the case will be adjudicated according to the substantive law 
that would apply in State A (using State A’s choice-of-law rules); but if a 
federal court decides the forum-selection clause issue, the case will be 
adjudicated according to the substantive law that would apply in State B 
(using State B’s choice-of-law rules). The third is a vertical substantive 
law concern: the validity of a forum-selection clause and the appropriate 
remedies for its enforcement are fundamentally questions of substantive 
contract law, for which state law must be followed just like other private 
law issues traditionally governed by state law (such as the defendant’s 
duty of care in a tort case like Erie itself). This Part examines these potential 
Erie problems in more detail. 
Let us first address the relocation concern. Imagine that a plaintiff 
wishes to sue in State A, but the forum-selection clause requires disputes 
to proceed in State B. If a State A state court and a State A federal court 
take opposite views of a contractual forum-selection clause, then the 
choice between state and federal court means the difference between 
having the case adjudicated in State A or in State B. Although geography 
alone might not implicate truly substantive rights, it may contravene the 
“twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and 
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”60 To have a federal 
rule that allows plaintiffs to evade forum-selection clauses that would be 
binding in state court—or to allow defendants to compel the enforcement 
of forum-selection clauses that would be invalid in state court—would 
 
 58. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum 
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509 
(examining whether a particular state law “is incompatible with federal interests”). 
 59. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); see also Semtek, 531 U.S. at 
508 (noting that there was “no need for a uniform federal rule”). 
 60. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
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seem to encourage precisely the sort of vertical forum shopping Erie is 
meant to discourage. 
According to Justice Scalia, in fact, it is “inevitabl[e]” that such 
differences would provide a “significant encouragement to forum 
shopping.”61 As Justice Scalia explained in his Stewart dissent, “[v]enue 
is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency with 
which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit might well 
not be pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly less 
convenient forum.”62 
Justice Scalia found that a different federal approach to forum-
selection clauses “fails the second part of the twin-aims test as well, 
producing inequitable administration of the laws.”63 He wrote in Stewart: 
The decision of an important legal issue should not turn on the 
accident of diversity of citizenship, or the presence of a federal 
question unrelated to that issue. It is difficult to imagine an issue of 
more importance, other than one that goes to the very merits of the 
lawsuit, than the validity of a contractual forum-selection provision.64 
He then observed: “Certainly, the Erie doctrine has previously been held 
to require the application of state law on subjects of similar or obviously 
lesser importance,”65 giving as examples “whether filing of complaint or 
service tolls statute of limitations,”66 “arbitrability,”67 and “indemnity 
bond[s] for litigation expenses.”68 
Although Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter in Stewart, the 
majority did not disagree with him on these points. Rather, Justice 
Marshall’s majority opinion in Stewart concluded that encouraging 
forum shopping was irrelevant because § 1404(a) “control[led] the 
issue.”69 As explained below, however, the Stewart majority’s attitude 
toward the preemptive scope of § 1404(a) is hard to square with more 
 
 61. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 39–40. Elaborating on the sort of forum shopping that was likely to occur in connection 
with forum-selection clauses, Justice Scalia wrote:  
[I]n a State with law unfavorable to validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid the effect of a 
clause will be encouraged to sue in state court, and nonresident defendants will be 
encouraged to shop for more favorable law by removing to federal court. In the reverse 
situation—where a State has law favorable to enforcing such clauses—plaintiffs will be 
encouraged to sue in federal court.  
Id. at 40. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)). 
 67. Id. at 41 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202–04 (1956)). 
 68. Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1949)). 
 69. Id. at 31 (majority opinion); see also id. at 32 n.11 (“Because a validly enacted Act of 
Congress controls the issue in dispute, we have no occasion to evaluate the impact of application of 
federal judge-made law on the ‘twin aims’ that animate the Erie doctrine.”). 
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recent Supreme Court opinions on the Erie doctrine. If, instead, 
§ 1404(a) must be interpreted to accommodate state law regarding 
forum-selection clauses, Justice Scalia’s concerns about the effect of 
relocation on Erie’s twin aims become dispositive. 
Indeed, this tension with Erie’s twin aims existed even though, 
according to the Stewart majority, the basic Van Dusen rule would apply 
in the forum-selection clause situation: a § 1404(a) transfer to the court 
designated in the forum-selection clause would not have made any 
change in the substantive law that would govern the dispute.70 That is—
as Justice Scalia argued in his Stewart dissent—the relocation alone would 
offend Erie’s twin aims. Atlantic Marine compounds the potential Erie 
problem by declaring, for the first time, that Van Dusen does not apply 
when a § 1404(a) transfer is based on a valid forum-selection clause: 
“The court in the contractually selected venue should not apply the law 
of the transferor venue to which the parties waived their right.”71 
Atlantic Marine, therefore, creates a second Erie concern—a 
horizontal choice-of-law concern. Not only will different approaches to 
forum-selection clauses mean that a case will proceed in a different 
geographic location depending on whether it is filed in state court or 
federal court, but those different approaches can also lead to a disparity 
in the substantive law that will ultimately govern the dispute between the 
parties. Such a disparity flies in the face of the Erie-driven choice-of-law 
framework reflected in Klaxon, Van Dusen, and other Supreme Court 
cases. 
The basic rule under Klaxon is that a federal court applies the 
choice-of-law rules of the state in which it is located.72 Erie required that 
approach, the Klaxon Court explained, because “[a]ny other ruling 
would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state upon 
which [Erie] is based”; “the accident of diversity of citizenship would 
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and 
federal courts sitting side by side.”73 
Van Dusen’s approach to choice of law in the § 1404(a) context is 
similarly motivated by the Erie-inspired need to “ensure that the 
‘accident’ of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a party to 
utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have 
been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed.”74 
 
 70. Id. at 32 (emphasizing that “a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) does not carry with it a change in 
the applicable law” (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964))). 
 71. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013). 
 72. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“[T]he prohibition declared in Erie R. Co. 
v. Tompkins extends . . . to the field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal 
court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.” (citation omitted)). 
 73. Id. at 496–97 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938)). 
 74. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638. 
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Imagine a case that is filed in State A federal court and then transferred 
to State B federal court under § 1404(a). If that case had instead been 
filed in State A state court—where § 1404(a) does not permit a transfer 
to a court in another state—the State A court would use its own choice-
of-law rules to determine the substantive law that would ultimately apply 
to the dispute. Van Dusen makes sure that the same law would apply in 
federal court, by requiring the State B federal court—which is hearing 
the case solely because of a § 1404(a) transfer—to apply the substantive 
law that would apply in State A. As Van Dusen explained, “the critical 
identity to be maintained is between the federal district court which 
decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was 
filed.”75 
More recently, in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,76 the Supreme Court 
clarified that the Van Dusen rule applies even if the plaintiff requests the 
§ 1404(a) transfer. As Justice Kennedy explained in Ferens, “§ 1404(a) 
should not deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist absent 
diversity jurisdiction.”77 This policy “has its real foundation in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.”78 He continued: 
The Erie rule remains a vital expression of the federal system and the 
concomitant integrity of the separate States . . . . “In essence, the intent 
of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal 
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of 
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal 
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine 
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”79 
To adopt a choice-of-law approach where a § 1404(a) transfer leads to 
the application of different substantive law “would undermine the Erie 
rule in a serious way. It would mean that initiating a transfer under 
§ 1404(a) changes the state law applicable to a diversity case.”80 
To allow different treatment of forum-selection clauses in state 
court and federal court would produce precisely this problematic result; 
it would “deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist absent 
diversity jurisdiction”81 and destroy the “critical identity . . . between the 
 
 75. Id. at 639 (emphasis added). 
 76. 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
 77. Id. at 523. 
 78. Id. at 524 (internal citation omitted). 
 79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)). 
 80. Id. at 526. 
 81. Id. at 523. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ferens did make the following observation: 
“We have held, in an isolated circumstance, that § 1404(a) may pre-empt state law.” Id. at 526 (citing 
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that federal law determines the 
validity of a forum-selection clause). But he recognized in the very next sentence—relying explicitly on 
Justice Scalia’s Stewart dissent—that, “[i]n general . . . we have seen § 1404(a) as a housekeeping 
measure that should not alter the state law governing a case under Erie.” Id. (citing Van Dusen v. 
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federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in 
which the action was filed.”82 First, consider the situation where a state 
court would dismiss a case pursuant to a forum-selection clause but a 
federal court would not. A plaintiff sues in State A, but the forum-
selection clause requires disputes to proceed in State B. In State A state 
court, which would enforce the forum-selection clause, the case would be 
dismissed for refiling in State B, where the case will be governed by the 
substantive law that would govern in State B. In federal court, however, 
the case would remain in the State A federal court and—under Klaxon—
would be governed by the substantive law that would govern in State A. 
We would have exactly the same disparity that Van Dusen and Ferens 
refused to tolerate. 
An identical problem would arise if the federal court would enforce 
the forum-selection clause but the state court would not. If filed in State 
A state court, the case would remain there and would be governed by the 
substantive law that would apply in State A. If filed in State A federal 
court, however, the court would transfer the case to State B federal 
court; under Atlantic Marine, the State B federal court would apply the 
substantive law that would apply in State B.83 
The third and final Erie concern is independent of the substantive 
law that will ultimately govern the parties’ dispute. This concern, rather, 
is the substantive law by which the effect of the forum-selection clause 
itself is determined. The effect of a forum-selection clause raises issues of 
contract law that are quintessentially the realm of state law. For a federal 
court to displace state contract law is arguably a classic interference with 
state law substantive rights in violation of Erie. Just as a federal court 
could not disregard state tort law and declare its own standard of care for 
the duty owed by the Erie Railroad Co. toward Mr. Tompkins,84 a 
federal court may not disregard state contract law and declare its own 
standard of contract validity for forum-selection clauses.85 To have a 
 
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964); Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding the language 
of § 1404(a) “plainly insufficient” to work a change in the applicable state law through pre-emption)).  
  Indeed, as explained below, giving § 1404(a) the sort of preemptive scope suggested by Stewart 
is inconsistent with more recent Erie doctrine decisions. See infra notes 102–114 and accompanying 
text. Moreover, the § 1404(a) transfer envisioned in Stewart would not have resulted in a change to the 
substantive law. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Under Atlantic Marine, the substantive law 
would change. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013). 
 82. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. 
 83. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 81–82 (1938) (Butler, J., concurring) (describing 
how the lower court in Erie disregarded decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding the 
duty owed to the plaintiff). 
 85. It is an open question, of course, as to what qualifies as truly substantive rights for this 
purpose. This issue has evaded doctrinal clarity in the analogous context of when a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure impermissibly abridges, enlarges, or modifies substantive rights. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b) (2012). Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
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federal approach to such contract questions trump the state law approach 
not only invites forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws 
(for all the reasons discussed above), it may also implicate Erie’s 
constitutional core.86 
Admittedly, displacement of state law might be permissible if it is 
justified by a uniquely federal interest.87 But that interest must be more 
than merely the fact that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the case 
in which the forum-selection clause is invoked.88 That interest must be 
more than merely the fact that federal courts have authority to develop 
procedures for adjudicating a case,89 including procedures for resolving 
whether a forum-selection clause mandates a particular course of action. 
That interest must be more than merely the federal court’s view that a 
different standard for contract validity would be more desirable.90 
For some kinds of cases, a sufficient federal interest may well exist. 
Where a forum-selection clause impacts federal law claims, a federal 
interest may justify deviating from state law with respect to the 
 
406–15 (2010) (Scalia, J.), with id. at 417–28 (Stevens, J., concurring) (each offering different 
interpretations of the Rules Enabling Act’s substantive rights provisions). Arguably, the Rules 
Enabling Act’s substantive rights provision and the constitutional core of Erie are one and the same. 
See Steinman, supra note 49, at 324 (“If [a] Federal Rule does not override substantive rights, then it 
passes muster under both the Rules Enabling Act and Erie’s constitutional core.”). But cf. id. at 324–
25 n.427 (recognizing that there may be a mismatch in federal question cases between federal common 
law authority and rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act). And state law itself may play a 
role in determining whether a particular aspect of state law is, or is not, substantive. See, e.g., Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 
106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 11–14 (2012). Even if one concludes that the contractual validity of a forum-
selection clause does not override state law substantive rights with respect to the forum-selection clause 
itself, the practical consequences of giving different effect to such clauses in state and federal court—in 
terms of relocation and a change in the substantive law that will govern the dispute—raise significant 
Erie concerns on their own. See supra pp. 806–08. 
 86. Justice Scalia’s Stewart dissent alluded to this point as well when he wrote, at the end of his 
paragraph discussing the potential for inequitable administration of laws, “[n]or can or should courts 
ignore that issues of contract validity are traditionally matters governed by state law.” Stewart, 487 
U.S. at 41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 87. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981) (“The vesting of 
jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal 
common law . . . .”); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) 
(“This principle [that a jurisdictional grant alone does justify federal common law] follows from Erie 
itself, where, although the federal courts had jurisdiction over diversity cases, we held that the federal 
courts did not possess the power to develop a concomitant body of general federal law.”); Martha A. 
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 922–23 (1986) 
(arguing that Erie “clearly rejects the proposition that a court can make federal common law simply 
because it has jurisdiction”). 
 89. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 317 (“[T]he mere authority to develop procedures for 
adjudicating disputes is not a sufficient basis for the federal judiciary to impose federal substantive 
law.”); see also id. at 288–93, 290 n.256 (explaining how a different federal approach to summary 
judgment could interfere with state substantive law). 
 90. See id. at 327–28, 328 n.439. 
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contractual validity of that clause.91 This may explain, for example, why 
the Supreme Court has declared—in cases like The Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co.92 and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute93—that federal 
law governs forum-selection clauses in admiralty cases.94 It is also 
possible that particular situations presented by particular cases (the 
“extraordinary circumstances” Justice Alito alluded to in Atlantic Marine) 
might justify federal displacement of state contract law.95 But it is hard to 
see why, as a general matter, there is a uniquely federal interest that 
allows federal courts to disregard state law on the contractual validity of 
forum-selection clauses. 
Moreover, even if federal common law does govern the contractual 
validity of a forum-selection clause, courts must consider whether federal 
common law should incorporate state law. As discussed above, 
incorporation of state law is appropriate unless a significant conflict 
exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation 
of state law, or there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law.96 The 
Supreme Court has taken this requirement seriously. For example, even 
though it concluded that “federal common law governs the claim-
preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity,” the 
Court held that such federal common law should “adopt[], as the 
federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by 
state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits.”97 
IV.  ERIE and 28 U.S.C. § 1404 
One possible retort to the argument that state law governs the 
contractual validity of forum-selection clauses is that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
 
 91. See id. at 318 (arguing that “[i]n general, Congress’ choice to enact substantive legislation in a 
particular area creates a federal interest that is more than merely adjudicative and that, therefore, 
justifies federal lawmaking on related issues left unanswered by the relevant statute” and that this 
explains “why the Erie doctrine is largely absent from federal question cases”). 
 92. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 93. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 94. See id. at 590 (“[T]his is a case in admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the 
forum-selection clause we scrutinize.”); Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 (“We believe this is the correct 
doctrine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”); see also Steinman, supra note 
49, at 319 n.411 (arguing that federal common law in admiralty cases “is grounded in precisely the kind 
of uniquely federal interest that justifies substantive federal common law in other areas” (citing S. Pac. 
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (describing the need to prevent state law from “interfer[ing] 
with the proper harmony and uniformity of [general maritime law] in its international and interstate 
relations”)). Although the prevailing view is that federal judicial lawmaking is justified in maritime 
cases, that view has not been immune from scholarly critique. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption 
at Sea, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1999) (noting that “admiralty is often assumed to be the 
paradigm case of truly legitimate federal common law” but arguing that maritime cases should not be 
exempt from Erie). 
 95. See infra Part V. 
 96. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 97. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001). 
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federalizes the issue. In Stewart, after all, the majority held that “federal 
law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), governs the District Court’s decision 
whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause and transfer 
this case . . . .”98 
Through the lens of Erie, the presence of a federal statute is 
significant whether we view forum-selection clauses as implicating Erie’s 
constitutional core (protecting state law substantive rights) or the sub-
Erie inquiry into forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws. 
A federal statute can eliminate the potential constitutional problem 
because the Supremacy Clause itself allows a federal statute to trump 
state law.99 For the same reason, a federal statute can eliminate the need 
to engage Erie’s twin aims. Indeed, the same decision that first 
articulated the twin aims test—Hanna v. Plumer—also explained how 
federal positive law changes the Erie inquiry. While the twin aims are 
dispositive for a “relatively unguided Erie choice,”100 a federal statute 
“must be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress’ authority 
under the Constitution.”101 
There are several reasons to question the notion that § 1404(a) can 
trump state law with respect to the validity of forum-selection clauses. 
First, that view ignores aspects of the Erie doctrine that have been 
brought into sharper focus in the quarter century since Stewart was 
decided. Second, it is undermined—at least implicitly—by the Atlantic 
Marine decision itself. And third, it overlooks potential constitutional 
concerns. 
When a party invokes federal positive law—whether a federal 
statute or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—to preempt the standard 
Erie analysis, there is a crucial threshold question: does that federal 
positive law actually “control” the particular issue for which the other 
party is invoking state law? The Supreme Court has framed this inquiry 
in a number of ways: whether the issue is “covered by” the statute or 
 
 98. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988); see also Jumara v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877–78 (3d Cir. 1995) (“In federal court, the effect to be given a contractual forum 
selection clause in diversity cases is determined by federal not state law.”). 
 99. Even if § 1404(a) eliminates the constitutional problem, one could still argue that it should be 
read to incorporate state law with respect to contract validity. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 
U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (“In the determination of ownership [for purposes of federal income tax liability], 
state law controls.”); see also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (“Whether 
latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress. 
Even where there is related federal legislation in an area, as is true in this instance, it must be 
remembered that ‘Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states . . . .’” 
(quoting Henry M. Hart & Herbert Wechsler, the Federal Courts and the Federal System 435 
(1953))). The inquiry into whether state law should be employed when applying a federal statute is 
analogous to the question of whether state law should be incorporated into federal common law. See 
Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68–69. 
 100. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 101. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 31–32. 
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rule; whether the statute or rule “answers the question in dispute”; 
whether the scope of the statute or rule “is sufficiently broad to control 
the issue before the Court”; whether the “clash” between state law and 
the federal statute or rule is “unavoidable”; whether the federal statute 
or rule “leav[es] no room for the operation of state law”; and whether 
the federal statute or rule and state law “can exist side by side, each 
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.”102 Or 
as Justice Ginsburg put it recently: “Is this conflict really necessary?”103 
In the quarter century since Stewart, the Court has emphasized 
that—when undertaking this inquiry—federal courts must interpret 
positive federal law (whether a federal statute or a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure) to accommodate state law, provided the statute or rule is 
flexible or ambiguous enough to do so.104 If the text of the federal statute 
or rule does not itself dictate a result that is contrary to state law, the 
choice should be treated as a “relatively unguided Erie choice;”105 that is, 
the federal statute or rule must be applied in a way that is consistent with 
state law if doing otherwise would offend the “twin aims of the Erie rule: 
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”106 
A good example of this was the 1996 decision in Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities, Inc.107 There, the Court recognized that Federal Rule 59 
governed a defendant’s post-trial motion challenging a jury’s damage 
award as excessive. Because of Erie, however, federal courts were 
required to use the state law standard for evaluating such damage awards 
(in that case, New York’s “deviates materially” standard)—rather than 
the traditional federal approach that allowed a new trial only when the 
award was so excessive as to “shock the conscience.”108 Gasperini reasoned 
that Rule 59 itself did not impose the shock-the-conscience standard that 
had long applied in federal court: “Whether damages are excessive for 
the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. And there is no 
candidate for that governance other than the law that gives rise to the 
claim for relief—here, the law of New York.”109 Accordingly, Gasperini 
rejected the idea that Rule 59 created “a ‘federal standard’ for new trial 
motions in ‘direct collision’ with, and ‘leaving no room for the operation 
 
 102. Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady 
Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1131, 1135–36 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 437 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657 (1959)). 
 104. See Steinman, supra note 102, at 1144–53. 
 105. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
 106. Id. at 468. 
 107. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 108. See id. at 437 n.22; see also Steinman, supra note 49, at 283–84. 
 109. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22. 
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of,’ a state law like [New York’s].”110 More recently, in Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,111 all nine Justices 
endorsed the view that, for Erie purposes, Federal Rules should be 
construed—if possible—to avoid substantial variations in outcomes 
between state and federal cases.112 
Section 1404(a)’s standard for transferring venue—“[f]or the 
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice”113—is 
flexible enough to allow a federal court to give force to a forum-selection 
clause that would be binding as a matter of state law. As Atlantic Marine 
itself recognized, “[i]n all but the most unusual cases, . . . ‘the interest of 
justice’ is served by holding parties to their bargain.”114 This insight also 
applies in cases where state law would deem a forum-selection clause to 
be contractually invalid. Even if one accepts that the selection of a forum 
by the parties will satisfy § 1404(a)’s requirements for a transfer to that 
forum, the statute is open ended enough to accommodate state law 
regarding whether the parties have truly selected that forum as a matter 
of contract law. Either way, the key inquiry would become whether 
allowing a federal court to reach a different conclusion than the state court 
about the contractual validity of a forum-selection clause is likely to 
encourage forum shopping or lead to inequitable administration of the 
laws. 
To view § 1404(a) as federalizing contractual validity is also in 
tension with some of the reasoning in Atlantic Marine—in particular, the 
Court’s view that its approach applies with equal force when a forum-
selection clause “call[s] for a nonfederal forum.”115 As Justice Alito 
recognized, “§ 1404(a) ha[d] no application” in this context, because that 
provision authorizes a transfer only to another federal district or division. 
Instead, forum-selection clauses that specify a state or foreign court may 
be enforced using “the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens.”116 
 
 110. Id. (quoting id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Thus, Gasperini squarely refutes a key premise 
of Stewart: that accommodating state law is problematic because “it makes the applicability of a 
federal statute depend on the content of state law.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 
n.10 (1988). After Gasperini, it is clear that a federal rule or statute can be applied differently 
depending on the content of state law. 
 111. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 405 n.7. The Shady Grove majority ultimately concluded that Rule 23 was not 
susceptible to a reading that could accommodate state law. Id. (“[T]here is only one reasonable 
reading of Rule 23.”). Four Justices, in dissent, found that Rule 23 could be read to avoid a conflict 
with state law. See id. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But it was neither argued nor considered, in 
Shady Grove, whether state law might play a role in the application of Rule 23’s requirements. See 
Steinman, supra note 102, at 1144. 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 114. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013). 
 115. Id. at 576. 
 116. Id. at 581. 
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Nonetheless, Atlantic Marine explained that “because both § 1404(a) 
and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives entail the 
same balancing-of-interests standard, courts should evaluate a forum-
selection clause pointing to a nonfederal forum in the same way that they 
evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to a federal forum.”117 
However, there is no Act of Congress that federalizes the forum non 
conveniens doctrine. That Atlantic Marine treated § 1404(a) and forum 
non conveniens as identical vehicles for enforcing a forum-selection 
clause indicates that the presence of a federal statute itself cannot be what 
resolves whether state or federal law governs the contractual validity of a 
forum-selection clause. 
Here is one final observation on whether § 1404(a) authorizes 
federal courts to displace state contract law. Although Acts of Congress 
are often viewed as a federalizing, anti-Erie trump card, it is worth 
considering whether Erie places limits on congressional authority as 
well.118 Justice Brandeis’ reasoning in Erie, after all, contemplated a 
constitutional principle that constrained both Congress and the federal 
courts: “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common 
law applicable in a State . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports 
to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”119 
What constitutional limit on congressional authority did Justice 
Brandeis have in mind? This has long been a mystery—and it has earned 
Erie considerable criticism.120 There is, however, a plausible legislative 
counterpart to Erie: Just as federal courts may not displace substantive 
state law simply because they have jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular 
case,121 Congress may not pass a law that displaces substantive state law 
solely on the basis that federal courts might have jurisdiction over cases 
concerning those substantive areas of law.122 And just as federal courts 
may not override substantive state law under the guise of developing 
procedural rules,123 Congress may not pass a law that overrides state 
substantive law solely because it wants to establish procedures for federal 
courts.124 The parallel between these judicial and legislative constraints 
fits with Justice Brandeis’ logic in Erie, yet it would not upset 
 
 117. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
 118. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 317 n.399, 322 n.420. 
 119. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 120. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie As the Worst Decision of 
All Time, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 129, 143 (2011) (“It is doubtful that Erie’s federalism limitation on congressional 
power was correct when it was decided, and doctrinal developments have made it even less valid.”). 
 121. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 316. 
 122. See id. at 317 n.399, 322 n.420 (questioning whether Congress can enact substantive law solely 
because of its “power to regulate the business of the federal courts” or “on the basis that federal courts 
might adjudicate claims concerning those substantive areas of law”). 
 123. See id. at 316–17. 
 124. See id. at 317 n.399, 322 n.420. 
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contemporary views of congressional power. Congress would retain 
authority to make substantive law pursuant to other enumerated powers 
(for example, the Commerce Clause).125 The legislative counterpart to 
Erie that I suggest here is simply that Congress’s power vis-à-vis the 
federal judiciary—standing alone—does not justify displacing substantive 
rights created by state law.  
This view would be in some tension with the dicta in Hanna that  
the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power 
to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, 
which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though 
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are 
rationally capable of classification as either.126  
It would certainly conflict with more aggressive readings of congressional 
authority in this regard, such as John Hart Ely’s famous example that 
Congress could impose a substantive “no-fault system” for all diversity-
jurisdiction accident cases on the “procedural” theory that “keeping 
accident cases out of federal courts will clear their dockets so that they 
can do juster justice in other cases.”127 
But the Supreme Court has yet to approve anything along the lines 
of Ely’s hypothetical. Indeed, just a few years before Hanna’s dicta on 
this issue, the Court spoke in much more skeptical terms. The Court 
noted in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America128 that the defendant’s 
proposed interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act—which would 
have compelled a different result in federal court than state court as to 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement—raised constitutional 
concerns because “Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does 
not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to 
controversies in diversity of citizenship cases.”129 More recently, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that federalism concerns may demand a 
narrower view of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper 
 
 125. See id. at 322 n.420. 
 126. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965). 
 127. Ely, supra note 6, at 706 n.77. 
 128. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
 129. Id. at 201–02. In the decades since Bernhardt, the Supreme Court has clarified that the 
constitutional authority for the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the Commerce Clause, not 
Congress’s power over the federal judiciary. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“The 
Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the 
Commerce Clause.”). That has seemingly eliminated the potential Erie problem with the FAA, and 
has given the FAA an even more sweeping scope insofar as it now binds state courts as well as federal 
courts. See id. at 16 (holding that the FAA “creat[ed] a substantive rule applicable in state as well as 
federal courts”). The Erie concern remains, however, for § 1404(a)—which is not based on Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32 (noting that § 1404(a)’s constitutional 
basis is “Congress’s powers under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause”).  
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Clause.130 All of this suggests that § 1404(a)—an unquestionably procedural 
statute based solely on Congress’s authority vis-à-vis the federal courts—
should not be a basis for overriding substantive state law. 
V.  Extraordinary Circumstances: When Might a Federal Court 
Refuse to Enforce a Valid Forum-Selection Clause? 
Justice Alito recognized that there may be some “extraordinary 
circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties” that would 
permit a federal court to deny a § 1404(a) motion despite a contractually 
valid forum-selection clause.131 A decision to disregard a valid forum-
selection clause, however, must be justified by “public-interest factors 
only”132—factors that may include “the administrative difficulties flowing 
from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies 
decided at home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case 
in a forum that is at home with the law.”133 
Justice Alito provided no concrete examples of when the public 
interest factors might warrant a refusal to enforce a contractually valid 
forum-selection clause, except to say that they would be “exceptional,”134 
“extraordinary,”135 “rare[]”136 and “unusual.”137 It should be kept in 
mind, however, that a party contesting a forum-selection clause need 
only establish the presence of such “extraordinary circumstances” if the 
clause is valid under state law. Many potential objections to a forum-
selection clause might be vindicated by the state law inquiry into contractual 
validity. 
Assuming that the forum-selection clause is contractually valid 
under state law, the question, as viewed through the lens of Erie, should 
be framed as follows: When can a federal court legitimately displace 
substantive rights created by state contract law? One answer is that a 
uniquely federal interest can justify a federal judicial override of state 
substantive law. This notion is reflected in the “classic” federal common 
 
 130. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–22 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 156–57 (1992); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012) 
(Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 131. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013). 
 132. Id. at 582. 
 133. Id. at 581 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 
(1981)); see supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. 
 134. Id. at 581 (“[N]o such exceptional factors appear to be present in this case.”). 
 135. Id. (“Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties 
should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”). 
 136. Id. at 582 (“[T]hose factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion . . . .”). 
 137. Id. (“[T]he practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.”). 
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law cases,138 as well as the Supreme Court’s pre-Hanna decision in Byrd 
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative.139 
One could certainly articulate a relationship between some of the 
public interest factors identified in Atlantic Marine and the sort of 
federal interests that might justify an override of state substantive law in 
the context of a forum-selection clause.140 If, for example, especially 
severe “court congestion”141 was present in the selected federal district, 
there might be a unique federal interest in avoiding further burdens on 
that district. Relatedly, severe congestion or some other emergency 
could deprive the contractually chosen district of the practical ability to 
adjudicate the case, which could undermine the integrity of the federal 
judicial process.142 It might be a more difficult argument that there is a 
uniquely federal interest in “having localized controversies decided at 
home” or “having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home 
with the law.”143 These interests would seem to be just as strong—if not 
stronger—with respect to a state court that is asked to dismiss a case 
away based on a forum-selection clause. But just to be clear: if the state 
court would vindicate these interests by refusing to enforce the forum-
selection clause, Erie should require the federal court to do the same (for 
all the reasons described earlier).144 
 
 138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 139. 356 U.S. 525, 537–39 (1958) (stating that “countervailing” interests such as “the essential 
character or function of a federal court” might justify a federal rule notwithstanding an effect on the 
outcome that would otherwise be unacceptable under Erie). 
 140. It should be remembered, of course, that Piper’s list of public interest factors (and private 
interest factors, for that matter) was never meant to be exhaustive. See, e.g., King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
562 F.3d 1374, 1381–82 (11th Cir. 2009) (“These factors are not exhaustive or dispositive, and courts 
are free to be flexible in responding to cases as they are presented.”). 
 141. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6 (recognizing “administrative difficulties flowing from court 
congestion” as a public interest factor). 
 142. The idea that the integrity of the federal judicial process might be a federal interest that 
justifies departing from state law finds support in Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. See 531 
U.S. 497, 509 (2001). Relying on Erie, Semtek recognized that decisions by federal courts sitting in 
diversity should ordinarily have the same preclusive effect as decisions of the state courts where the 
federal court is located. Id. at 508–09. It recognized, however, that: 
[S]tate law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with 
federal interests. If, for example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to 
dismissals for willful violation of discovery orders, federal courts’ interest in the integrity of 
their own processes might justify a contrary federal rule. 
Id. at 509. 
 143. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6.  
 144. If the state court would enforce the forum-selection clause—and the federal court therefore 
transfers the case under § 1404(a)—it is also conceivable that the contractually designated federal 
district might then transfer the case under § 1404(a) to a district that is more “at home” with the 
dispute and the law that would govern it. This would hold the parties to their enforceable bargain that 
the case be filed in the selected district, but would still allow the federal judiciary to manage where—
within the federal judicial system as a whole—is the most suitable venue to ultimately adjudicate the 
case. That second transfer would not be compelled as a matter of contract law, so it would not 
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Conclusion: ATLANTIC MARINE and State Law 
Where does this leave us? Erie is a notoriously complex and 
unpredictable area of law. It is clear, however, that the potential Erie 
concerns described above would disappear with one simple clarification 
of the Atlantic Marine framework: For purposes of Atlantic Marine’s 
footnote 5—at least for diversity cases—a forum-selection clause is 
contractually valid if and only if it would be deemed valid and 
enforceable by the state court where the federal district court is located. 
This refinement solves the Erie relocation problem, because the 
federal court will transfer the case under Atlantic Marine only when a 
state court would provide a similar remedy. And it solves the Erie 
horizontal choice-of-law problem because the law-changing Atlantic 
Marine transfer will only occur if the state court would, pursuant to the 
forum-selection clause, dismiss the case for refiling in the contractually 
designated forum.145 And it solves the Erie vertical substantive law 
 
implicate the vertical substantive law concern described above. See supra notes 84–86 and 
accompanying text. And that second transfer would not entail any change to the substantive law, 
because it would be subject to the usual Van Dusen rule for § 1404(a) transfers. Thus, it would not implicate 
the horizontal choice-of-law concern described above. See supra notes 71–83 and accompanying text. 
 145. This understanding may also pave the way toward a more coherent general theory of how 
federal courts should handle choice-of-law questions when a case moves from one federal district to 
another. Prior to Atlantic Marine, the prevailing view was that for a § 1404(a) transfer, the transferee 
court must use the law that would apply in the state where the case was originally filed; but for a 
§ 1406(a) transfer, the transferee court must use the law that would apply in its own state. See, e.g., 
Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1980) (“If an action is transferred under § 1404(a), the 
state law of the transferor court should be applied. In contrast, if an action is transferred under 
§ 1406(a), the state law of the transferee district court should be applied.”). At first blush, Atlantic 
Marine seems to create an inelegant exception this rule by declaring that a venue-transfer motion 
based on a forum-selection clause is governed by § 1404(a) but must be treated like a § 1406 motion 
for purposes of choice of law. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
  Under an Erie-driven approach, however, there is no need for either an arbitrary line 
between § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) transfers or an arbitrary exception to that line for forum-selection 
clauses. Rather, the key question is: what law would ultimately have governed the case without the 
“accident” of diversity jurisdiction? See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. In other words, if 
the case had been filed in a state court in the state where the transferor court was located, what would 
have happened? See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639 (noting that, under Erie, “the critical identity to be 
maintained is between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in 
which the action was filed” (emphasis added)). Understood this way, Atlantic Marine’s choice-of-law 
rule for transfers based on a forum-selection clause presumes that a state court would dismiss the case 
pursuant to the forum-selection clause, after which the case would be refiled in the contractually 
selected state and be subject to that state’s choice-of-law rules. Van Dusen’s choice-of-law rule 
presumes that a state court (in which § 1404(a) does not apply) would keep the case and therefore 
would have applied its own choice-of-law rules. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. Indeed, 
Van Dusen explicitly left open the possibility that a different approach to choice of law following a 
§ 1404(a) transfer might be needed if it could be shown that the state court would have dismissed the 
case on forum non conveniens grounds. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 640 (“We do not attempt to 
determine whether . . . the same considerations would govern . . . if it was contended that the transferor 
State would simply have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.”). While it is 
beyond the scope of this article to explore this theory further, it provides a potentially fruitful 
alternative to one focused solely on which venue transfer statute—§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a)—applies. 
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concern because the federal court would not displace state contract law 
with its own approach. 
Accordingly, Atlantic Marine should not be read to impose a rigid, 
pro-enforcement rule for forum-selection clauses. It should not be read 
to disregard legitimate concerns about whether parties have meaningfully 
consented to such clauses in particular cases, or about the use of such 
clauses to constrain consumers or other parties with minimal bargaining 
power and no practical means to negotiate with the more powerful party. 
Rather, courts applying Atlantic Marine should look to state law to 
address these issues—as Erie requires. 
This understanding places Justice Alito’s narrow view of the 
“extraordinary circumstances” that justify disregarding a contractually 
valid forum-selection clause into proper perspective. If the forum-
selection clause would not be enforced in state court, then Atlantic 
Marine does not compel its enforcement in federal court. The extraordinary 
circumstances Justice Alito described allow a federal court to refuse 
enforcement of a forum-selection clause even where a state court would 
find the clause valid and enforceable. And as described above, those 
extraordinary circumstances might themselves be justified in terms of the 
unique federal interests that can allow federal courts to displace state 
law.146 
There is nothing in the Atlantic Marine opinion that forecloses this 
approach. Again, footnote 5 explicitly reserves the question of contract 
validity. It does not prejudge the role that state law might play in that 
regard, and there are strong arguments—as summarized above—that 
Erie requires federal courts to follow state law. It is worth addressing, 
however, some snippets of the Atlantic Marine opinion that might be 
misconstrued to require a distinct, federal approach to questions of 
contractual validity. 
At one point in the opinion, Justice Alito stated that “when a 
plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum—
presumably in exchange for other binding promises by the defendant—
the plaintiff has effectively exercised its ‘venue privilege’ before a dispute 
arises.”147 One might argue that this language reflects a rule that federal 
courts should “presum[e]” that forum-selection clauses are, in fact, 
agreed to “in exchange for other binding promises,” and that federal 
courts should therefore discount concerns that are legitimately addressed 
by substantive contract law—consent, bargaining power, and the like. 
That view, however, takes this sentence out of context. Again, the 
Court’s entire analysis “presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection 
 
 146. See supra Part V. 
 147. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (emphasis added). 
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clause.”148 If the forum-selection clause is contractually valid—an inquiry 
that is properly governed by state law—then this sentence from the 
opinion simply recognizes such a contractually valid clause can restrict 
the plaintiff’s “venue privilege.” It does not dictate a particular approach 
to determining contractual validity in the first instance. 
Later in the opinion, Justice Alito cited Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Stewart for the proposition that Bremen’s “reasoning 
applies with much force to federal courts sitting in diversity.”149 Bremen, 
of course, was a 1972 admiralty case where the Supreme Court adopted 
an approach to forum-selection clauses that was more inclined toward 
enforcement than “the traditional view of many American courts”—
which had often refused to enforce such clauses on the ground that they 
improperly “oust the jurisdiction of the courts.”150 But Justice Kennedy’s 
view in Stewart was this: “Though state policies should be weighed in the 
balance, the authority and prerogative of the federal courts to determine 
the issue, as Congress has directed by § 1404(a), should be exercised so 
that a valid forum-selection clause is given controlling weight in all but 
the most exceptional cases.”151 So Justice Kennedy’s view, as well, was 
premised on the existence of a valid forum-selection clause. Moreover, 
Justice Kennedy made this point in the context of Stewart’s understanding 
that the substantive law would not change when a forum-selection clause 
is enforced via § 1404(a).152 Under Atlantic Marine, a transfer based on a 
forum-selection clause would change the substantive law that would 
otherwise apply.153 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy has been an interesting figure in Erie’s 
evolution during the last quarter century. Not long after Stewart, Justice 
Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Ferens, in which he 
emphasized that “§ 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state-law 
advantages that exist absent diversity jurisdiction”154 and explained that 
this policy “has its real foundation in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.”155 
Indeed, his Ferens opinion explicitly embraced Justice Scalia’s Stewart 
dissent, citing his view that “the language of § 1404(a) was ‘plainly 
insufficient’ to work a change in the applicable state law through pre-
emption.”156 Justice Kennedy also joined Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion in Gasperini and her dissent in Shady Grove, both of which 
 
 148. Id. at 581 n.5. 
 149. Id. at 582 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 150. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 6 (1972). 
 151. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 152. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 42–47, 71 and accompanying text. 
 154. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990). 
 155. Id. at 524. 
 156. Id. at 526 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see supra note 81. 
Steinman-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:07 PM 
April 2015]           ATLANTIC MARINE THROUGH THE LENS OF ERIE 821 
concluded that state law should prevail in federal court notwithstanding 
the presence of federal positive law. As much as any Justice, Kennedy 
has been receptive to applying the Erie doctrine in a way that 
accommodates state law. 
* * * 
It is impossible to appreciate the full impact of Atlantic Marine 
without taking Erie into account. As described above, the Atlantic Marine 
decision leaves room for state law to play a significant role in 
determining the ultimate effect of a forum-selection clause in federal 
court. And forum-selection clauses raise several concerns that, under a 
proper understanding of Erie, should require federal courts to follow 
state law regarding whether such clauses must be enforced in particular 
cases.  
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